A lot of times when I’m discussing my time in Vietnam with other Vietnam Veterans, they have a difficult time understanding the differences between their role in a combat unit and our role as advisors to the Vietnamese.
Many of them, rightly so, envied our positions in Vietnam. Many of them spent weeks at a time in the field under harsh combat and weather conditions. In many cases American advisers were housed in relatively comfortable locations. Most of our larger advisory teams lived in separate compounds with many of the amenities that one expected if they were living on a military base at home. For example, at our Province Team headquartered in Moc Hòa, in the Delta, we had a great mess hall. The compound featured a large latrine/shower with hot water (most of the time), living quarters, a headquarters complex, a small PX/Class-6 Store and an all-ranks ‘Club’. The barracks rooms had electricity, lights and overhead fans. The enlisted quarters were two man affairs with bunk beds for two additional soldiers if needed. Officers had their own individual quarters. The headquarters building was even air conditioned. Definitely, the lap of luxury!
BOQ room at the Province Headquarters in Moc Hòa, circa 1971
In many cases we were housed in villages, and we had the availability of fresh fruits and vegetables from the local markets. While they were often consuming C-rations while they were in the field, we were eating cooked meals with our Vietnamese counterparts. Of course, you had to quickly learn to appreciate rice cooked in all of its various forms, but it was a lot better than a cold meal out of a can.
District HQ in Ap Bac – we lived in this building.
But perhaps the most difficult part of being an advisor is the fact that you had no command authority over anyone other than the other members of your team. I served on a small district team, made up of three men, a captain, a senior noncommissioned officer, and myself as a Second Lieutenant. I can assure you that even as a Second Lieutenant, when I was left in charge, I had little or no command authority. Having been a former Buck-Sargent myself, I also understood my role as an officer and the wisdom of listening to that senior Sergeant when I was left in charge.
But when we were dealing with the Vietnamese military, we had absolutely no command authority over what they were doing. Again, as a Second Lieutenant, a brand-new officer, as my Sergeant used to say; “I hadn’t even been an officer long enough to have scratches in my gold bars yet”, no seasoned Vietnamese officer was going to adjust his plan because I had recommended to do so. During one disastrous operation that I was involved with the Vietnamese captain who was leading the operation change the plan at the last minute. When I objected he looked at me and basically said sit down Lieutenant I’m in charge. A few seconds later four men were seriously wounded, and one was dead and the entire operation was blown.
His immediate response was that the plan that the Americans had designed wasn’t of any use and as a result it had failed. Of course, as a young advisor I was the one who was to be blamed for his failure. Had he followed the original plan possibly he would have succeeded. It was extremely frustrating, we had an excellent plan, and it should have worked and resulted in the capture of an important tax collection element operating in our district. But without any command authority all I could do is sit and watch the events as they unfolded and direct the evacuation of the dead and wounded on US assets.
Of course, the other major issues as I’ve discussed in other blogs was the fact that we had to work across major cultural political and military differences when we were trying to advise the Vietnamese.
From a cultural standpoint the Vietnamese had a different concept of time than we did. We expect that everyone will work towards a common goal to accomplish a mission based upon the time constraints that we have. I quickly found that that was not the case with working with the Vietnamese. As Lieutenant Colonel Tua, our excellent District Chief, told me one time, I needed to understand that opportunity does not just come around once. The Vietnamese believe in a ‘circle of life’ rather than our timed based concept. Their concept of time was that if something didn’t happen today, in a while it would roll back around and it could be accomplished at a later date. When Americans looked at time, we looked at the concept that ‘opportunity only strikes once’, and you responded to that opportunity immediately.
Another cultural issue basically dealt with honesty. The Vietnamese people are very honest people when they deal with one another. However, when they were dealing with the government that sense of honesty sometimes became a “what’s in it for me or my family”. Everyone was trying to figure out how they could get the most from the government for themselves or for their family. I discussed the first district chief that we dealt with and how dishonest he was. But he had actually been placed in that position by his father who was a general in the Vietnamese ministry of defense so that he could use his position to benefit and increase the wealth of the family. Much of the taxes that were collected did not end up going to the central government but ended going into the family coffers. He often used a system called ‘ghosting’ to ensure that money that should have been paid the soldiers went into his pockets instead. The method was to report that he had a hundred soldiers to pay; in reality he only had 60, but he collected the money for the entire 100. Graft and corruption was rampant and as an adviser we really weren’t in a position to do too much to stop it. We had to build a relationship with these people and reporting the fraud and abuse would damage that ability.
A cultural issue that took a while to resolve came from the colonial era with the French. When I arrived in 1969 Vietnam had only been independent for under 15 years. As my counterpart told me over the last 200 to 300 years the Vietnamese developed a cultural concept of “let the white man do it” and as a result they were reluctant to make a decision without the approval of the adviser. I think I shocked my counterpart when I told him that this was his war not mine. He was the one who had to make the decisions on what to do, not me, and as a result of that he had to begin taking responsibility for his actions instead of pushing the responsibility, or blame, on the advice that the advisors had given him. I told him over and over again that the Americans were leaving and that he would have to be able to stand on his own when we were gone. I told him that I was there to provide him support and some technical guidance, but I was not there to make the decisions for him. He told me that that was a unique feeling that he had for the first time, he always expected the Americans to tell him what to do.
Another major issue that we had to deal with was the political aspects of life in Vietnam. There were interesting undercurrents in dealing with politics in Vietnam. A Confucius philosophy stated that ”all government ended at the village gate”. The only thing that the emperor could do was collect taxes on the village and to require the village to produce military manpower in the event of a military conflict. But decision making went on at the local level. Various Vietnamese districts had been established by the government in Saigon, and they tried to push authority down to the district level and give the district chief more power than had previously been rendered in their governmental system. This was a French style of government, but it really didn’t fit into the Vietnamese model once the French were gone. I found that the most important person in any part of Vietnam was the village chief rather than the district chief. If you really wanted to get something accomplished in the village you had to convince the village chief that it needed to be done in order to make things happen. If the district chief got involved things might happen but at a very slow pace.
A portion of the cultural issue that I’ve talked about in the past is this concept of ‘loss of face’. Everyone always wanted to look good to their boss and in the intelligence business this was a difficult situation to counteract. They had a difficult time sharing intelligence, and that’s a very important part of the intelligence business. I actually had to use some methods of embarrassing my variety of counterparts to work together. Once that happened, we were able to make things work but in a lot of ways they weren’t happy with us.
One thing that I did find working with Military Assistance Command – Vietnam as an advisor was how many of us stayed for more than one tour. I arrived in late 1969 and was assigned to my district. I stayed there for the entire year working with my counterparts. The problem was that most advisers went home at the end of that year. The replacement would have to come in and reestablish all those old relationships, figure out what was going on and try to make things happen. I was fortunate in
that I was encouraged to extend my tour and stayed for an extra six months (I actually extended again but was forced to leave before the end of my tour – another ‘war story’). My captain had been in Vietnam for a number of years and as a result he was highly respected by the Vietnamese. The army finally forced him to leave Vietnam because he needed to attend his officers advanced course. He got out of the Army as soon as he came home!
On that extended tour I was able to work directly at the provincial level, and I knew all of the major players because I had worked with them when I was at the district level. As a result, I think we were very successful in developing top notch intelligence operations in our province. But, had I gone there for a one-year tour it would have taken me six months just to learn what was going on and then possibly I would have another three months where I could successfully make changes or make things work better. Our province senior advisor was required to spend an 18-month assignment in Vietnam because of that fact.
Advisors were expected to train, guide, and motivate South Vietnamese units, but they usually could not directly order Vietnamese officers or soldiers to act. That meant success depended on trust, persuasion, personal relationships, and the willingness of Vietnamese counterparts to accept advice. The most difficult part of being an American advisor to the Vietnamese during the Vietnam War was often trying to influence a war effort without having real command authority, while also working across major cultural, political, and military differences.
Finally, one of the most frustrating parts as an advisor was the constant change of focus of the war effort especially during the Vietnamization phase. When I first arrived in 1969, we still had some degree of control over Vietnamese troops. Some of them work directly for me and I had a level of command over them. A few months into my tour that ended. All Vietnamese troops were placed under control of the Vietnamese government. We were still expected to go to the field with them, but we had no control that we could exercise. A few months into my assignment we received orders from above stating that we were no longer allowed to go on combat missions with the Vietnamese we were to advise them about tactics and intelligence, but they were totally on their own at that point. When I returned in 1972 as an intelligence officer, we were only responsible for processing intelligence. We had to rely on the Vietnamese for all collection. Even though some of us did maintain our own agent nets it was difficult to get the intelligence into the command headquarters without at first going through the Vietnamese. We were trying to make them do the job that they’ve been trying to do at this point.
So, as you can see, the role of the advisor was a frustrating one in many instances. We had better living conditions than the guys in the field, but we had little or no security, we had to rely on our counterparts to protect, defend, and house us to stay alive.
I have no regrets. Serving as an advisor to the Vietnamese was a fascinating assignment. I learned a tremendous number of things about a new culture, about a new language and about people that I actually trusted. The Vietnamese people are a wonderful, wonderful people. They’re generous, kind, funny, and enjoyable to be with.
So, in short, the hardest part was probably being responsible for results without having full control over the people, decisions, or political conditions needed to achieve them.
If you’re enjoying these blogs, please drop me a comment or if you have any questions that I might answer, submit a comment on the comment pages. I’m always glad to hear from you.
Again, please look at all my books that I have listed. They can be reviewed and/or purchased from Amazon.com with the click of a button directly from my website: http://www.ptaylorvietnamadvisor.com, at Authors Published Works.
The Advisor Series:
- “The Senior Army Instructor; The Paul Tyler Saga Begins” (https://www.amazon.com/dp/BOGSXJ2ZHC)
- “The Advisor, Kien Bing, South Vietnam, 1969-1970. A Novel” (https://www.amazon.com/dp/B09L4X5NQ3)
- “The Province Senior Intelligence Advisor, Kien Song Province 1970-1971; A Novel” (https://www.amazon.com/dp/B0BHL2XCX5)
- “The Hardchargers,” Vietnam 1972-1973; A Novel” (https://www.amazon.com/dp/B0C7SPR1JY)
- “The Tuscarora Trail” (https://www.amazon.com/dp/B0D3QY2GM6)
Civil War History/Fiction:
- “A Civil War History of Harrison County West Virginia 1861-1865” (https://www.amazon.com/dp/ B0B1CLL28Q
- “The Most Hated Man in Clarksburg” (https://www.amazon.com/dp/ B0C6429M1X
Science Fiction: (Chuck Neighbors author, Taylor *editor/**coauthor)
| *“Destiny” https://www.amazon.com/dp/B0B6WGWHLS |
| *“HomeFall” https://www.amazon.com/dp/B0CJN1JLWF |
| **“The Planet’s Revenge; The Katy Sterling Saga Continues” https://www.amazon.com/dp/B0CYQBHC6C |
Leave a Reply