One of the things that was frustrating and to some degree and difficult to understand was with something called the monthly Rand Reports. We had to maintain a tremendous amount of detailed data on each individual village. In my case it dealt primarily with the intelligence situation, the number of identified the Việt Cộng Infrastructure (VCI) operating in each village area, the strength and capabilities of the local VC and NVA military units, known infiltration routes in the area and a variety of other intelligence pieces of information.
But we also had to report on economic information as well. For example, we had to discuss the number of tax collection efforts made by the Việt Cộng in the different villages. We would document rice production and how many bags of rice had gone to the rice mill that month from each village. If I recall correctly there were about ten or twelve of these large laminated charts (36″ x 30″) that we kept current. Anytime that we had a ranking officer that would come through the district we were expected to provide him with a complete briefing using those Rand charts.
One of my favorite stories dealt with Colonel David Hackworth, the 44th Special Tactical Zone commander and his initial visit to our district. He arrived late one afternoon with little warning. The newly assigned district senior advisor, a captain, met the Colonel at the Helo pad and brought him up to the team house. It was during the peak of the dry seasons; it was very hot and the first thing that Colonel Hackworth asked for was something to drink. Our captain offered him a beer, and Hackworth gave him a very nasty look as if to say, “you don’t drink while on duty captain!”
Colonel David Hackworth
As the intelligence officer my job was to start the briefing. I really didn’t need my charts, I had been there for eight or nine months and knew most of the information by heart, but I wanted to make sure that I covered everything that was listed on the Rand charts. After my basic introduction of the geography of the district and some basic background information I began my briefing. I had my pointer in hand, and I looked over and I noticed that it looked like the colonel was beginning to fall asleep. I became very energetic, pointing at the charts and taping them and moving around and just doing everything that I could to try to make sure that they was awake that I hadn’t put him to sleep. Finally, from the chair he was sitting in, he nodded and indicated that it was a good briefing. He asked a couple of questions that I had answers for and then I turned it over to the captain for his portion of the briefing.
The captain made a fatal mistake right away, he had not been in the district for more than about 30 days at that point and he was still in the learning process, so he started reading the slides. He provided no explanation, no additional information, he just started reading the slides. You could see that Colonel Hackworth was getting irritated. At one point he stopped him and asked him how long he had been there? He was informed that he’d only been there for just a few weeks. He told the captain that the next time he came for a briefing that he had better know what the hell he was talking about: The captain continued.
Colonel Hackworth was getting irritated and finally he looked at the captain and said, “captain I know that my army brass is US infantry, crossed idiot sticks, but I do know how to read, now tell me what the charts mean!” The captain was stunned by the comment. I don’t have to say that the captain did not last very long in this position before he was reassigned by Mr. Vann. We never saw him again.
The Rand charts were used to produce other reports that we did monthly. From an intelligence standpoint I would have to report on all the different types of intelligence operations that we were conducting within the district. I would have to brief on the Việt Cộng infrastructure in the district as well as the infiltration routes and the number of military actions that we had been involved with during that monthly. The reports were difficult to fill out, a lot of guesswork, but as I understand it Rand corporation used all this data to determine successes and failures in Vietnam.
Our main mission as advisors was to improve the security of the different villages in our district, we also had other responsibilities through CORDS as well. We would work with each of the villages to determine what they felt their specific needs were for economic, political, social and educational development.
Perhaps one of the best assets that I had available was an agricultural team that would come in from or IV Corps headquarters. Usually, they were veterinarians. They would come in and vaccinate animals, work with farmers on improving husbandry or perhaps improving farming production in our area. Another very valuable asset that I had with a mobile medical team that would visit our villages from the local Navy base in our area. A doctor and corpsman would go to each village and treat patients, provide medications, and work with the local midwives and primitive doctors that we had in each one of the districts villages.
The Vietnamese are always appreciated that type of actual physical support.
But while we still had military missions to perform as advisors, we were involved in all types of economic, educational, social and infrastructure development within our districts. We would work with the individual villages and the village chiefs and elders to determine what they felt were their needs and then work through higher headquarters, and ultimately with the Saigon government, to provide the assets for each one of those villages to succeed.
Some of these initiatives were quite simple. While I was there, we built three new schools, we did major road improvement along the canal so that the villagers could move goods up and down from village to village and to the district and province headquarters. We didn’t do the building but, we could advise the Vietnamese by getting engineering assistance with design and construction materials.
So, as you can see, the role of an advisor was unique. As far as our tours of duty were concerned, they were still twelve months in country like every combat soldier in Vietnam, although many of us stayed longer than that, especially if we felt that we were needed in that district or that province. At the end of my first year in Vietnam, I tried to re extend for another six-month tour at my district team. However, Mr. John Paul Vann appreciated the work that I had been doing in intelligence operations and with the pending vacancy for the Province Senior Intelligence Advisor position at Moc Hoa, the province capital, rather than staying at the district team he moved me up to the province team. Mr. Vann had a lot of discretion in who he assigned to different advisory positions within our area.
If you’re enjoying these blogs, please drop me a comment or if you have any questions that I might answer, submit a comment on the comment pages. I’m always glad to hear from you.
Again, please look at all my books that I have listed. They can be purchased from Amazon.com with the click of a button directly from my website,
The Advisor Series:
- “The Senior Army Instructor” (Available on Amazon ASIN: B0GSXJ2ZHC)
- “The Advisor, Kien Bing, South Vietnam, 1969-1970. A Novel” (Available on Amazon ASIN: B09L4X5NQ3)
- “The Province Senior Intelligence Advisor, Kien Song Province 1970-1971; A Novel” (Available on Amazon ASIN: B0BHL2XCX5)
- “The Hardchargers,” Vietnam 1972-1973; A Novel” (Available on Amazon ASIN: B0C7SPR1JY)
- “The Tuscarora Trail” (Available on Amazon ASIN: B0D3QY2GM6)
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